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NOTES 
 
State and Local Law Enforcement 
Response to Undocumented 
Immigrants 
CAN WE MAKE THE RULES, TOO? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2005, in the towns of New Ipswich and Hudson, New 
Hampshire, local police arrested eight suspected 
undocumented immigrants1 on charges of criminal trespass 
when they failed to provide proper identification.2  Local police 
resorted to this tactic after the federal authorities declined to 
take action against the suspects.3  This novel approach to 
immigration regulation at the state level drew national 
attention as several other local law enforcement offices 
throughout the country contemplated administrating a similar 
approach.4  On August 12, 2005, however, a state judge 
dismissed these charges, stating that they represented an 
unconstitutional attempt to regulate the enforcement of 
  
 1 The term “undocumented immigrant” is used to describe persons who “(1) 
have entered the country without inspection or with false documents; (2) have stayed 
beyond the expiration of their visas; (3) are working without authorization; or (4) are 
otherwise in violation of immigration laws.”  Victor C. Romero, Whatever Happened to 
the Fourth Amendment?: Undocumented Immigrants’ Rights After INS v. LOPEZ-
MENDOZA and UNITED STATES v. VERDUGO-URQUIDEZ, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 999, 
999 n.1 (1992). 
 2 Anand Vaishnav, N.H. Judge Dismisses Immigrants’ Trespass Charges, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 13, 2005, at B3. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Andrew Wolfe, Immigrants Cleared of Trespass Charges, NASHUA 
TELEGRAPH, Aug. 12, 2005. 
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immigration violations.5  The judge reasoned that the police 
action violated the supremacy clause because the federal 
regulation was “so pervasive” that it left no room for 
supplementation by the states.6  
While the charges against these eight suspects were 
dismissed, the fact that law enforcement felt compelled to take 
the action they did reflects the growing nation-wide concern 
about undocumented immigrants who live and work in the 
United States.  Typically, handling immigration matters is 
something that falls within the purview of the federal 
government.  This New Hampshire case illustrates, however, 
that the federal government does not always take action, or at 
least, as swiftly as some might hope.  As a result, local 
authorities across the country have started to take their own 
action by expanding criminal statutes to cover undocumented 
immigration, discriminatorily applying the law against 
undocumented immigrants, and acting as deputies of the 
federal immigration law.  They have resorted to these methods 
because it is thought that the federal government’s limited 
number of agents is inadequate to address the large numbers of 
undocumented immigrants.7 
This Note argues that the immigration legislation 
should remain within the purview of the federal government 
and that the state and local governments should neither 
expand laws nor arbitrarily and discriminatorily administer 
existing laws to address the issue of undocumented 
immigration, despite the perceived incapability of the federal 
government to handle the issue.  Instead, the local authorities 
should adhere to the systematic delegation of authorities that 
are made available by the existing federal immigration laws.  
Part II of this Note provides background information regarding 
  
 5 Hampshire v. Barros-Batistele, No. 05-CR-1474, 1475 (Nashua D. Ct. 
2005), available at http://www.courts.state.nh.us/district/criminal_trespass_ 
decision.pdf. 
 6 Id. (quoting Appeal of Conservation, 147 N.H. 89 (2001)).  
 7 Mohar Ray, “Can I See Your Papers?” Local Police Enforcement of Federal 
Immigration Law Post 9/11 and Asian American Permanent Foreignness, 11 WASH. & 
LEE RACE & ETHNIC ANCESTRY L.J. 197, 197 (2005). 
[W]ith a maximum of 5,500 federal immigration agents available to enforce 
immigration controls and an estimated eight million undocumented 
immigrants within the United States, the federal government is in dire need 
of increased manpower if it chooses to prioritize undocumented immigration 
control and criminal immigration enforcement issues on the federal agenda. 
Id. 
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the undocumented immigration situation within state and local 
communities, as well as a brief overview of the powers at both 
the federal and state level dealing with immigration matters.  
Part III describes and analyzes the various and conflicting 
ways that state and local authorities address undocumented 
immigrants within their communities.  Part IV argues that 
these state and local methods should not be used to combat 
illegal immigration because of their unlawful expansion of 
established authority and inherent ineffectiveness.  Instead, 
this Note advocates that adherence to the established method 
of regulated delegation of local enforcement by federal 
authorities is the more appropriate response to the 
undocumented immigration issues. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The issue of undocumented immigration is of significant 
importance.  The population of undocumented immigrants is 
reportedly at a record high and the rate of increase appears to 
be steady.8  It is the local communities that must ultimately 
absorb the impacts of this trend.  The communities have voiced 
their concerns and are now looking for solutions.9  The federal 
government has primary authority to regulate and enforce the 
immigration law.10  However, the steady increase in the 
population of undocumented immigrants reveals that the 
federal government does not have adequate resources to 
address the situation alone.11  Where the federal government 
lags, the onus falls on state and local law enforcement forces to 
assist in the cause.12  This has increasingly placed state and 
local authorities under scrutiny.  The question becomes if and 
how state and local law enforcement agencies can take matters 
into their own hands.  Both statutory law and the general 
judicial support for state and local enforcement of immigration 
law uphold the view that this is a viable option.13  Serious 
  
 8 Jeff Sessions & Cynthia Hayden, The Growing Role for State & Local Law 
Enforcement in the Realm of Immigration Law, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 323, 324-26 
(2005). 
 9 David M. Turoff, Note, Illegal Aliens: Can Monetary Damages be Recovered 
from Countries of Origin Under an Exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act?, 
28 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 179, 179-80 (2002). 
 10 IRA J. KURZBAN, KURZBAN’S IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOK 25 (10th ed. 
2006). 
 11 Sessions & Hayden, supra note 8, at 330. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. 
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concerns arise, however, when considering where the 
appropriate limits of this authority should be set. 
A. Undocumented Immigration Issues in Context 
The federal government appears to be overwhelmed by 
its efforts to control immigration, especially considering the 
large and increasing number of undocumented immigrants.  
There are an estimated eight to ten million undocumented 
immigrants living within the United States.14  The efforts made 
by the federal government to control the influx had little 
success as the population has shown a continuous growth at a 
rate of approximately 400,000 undocumented immigrants a 
year.15  One former U.S. ambassador16 has criticized the “very 
chaotic [federal immigration] system” as being under-funded 
and lacking any true cooperative effort with local authorities.17  
The Department of Homeland Security is said to be “choking on 
massive workloads” with an estimated backlog of 4.1 million 
pending immigration applications of various kinds.18 
The backlog at the federal level can create havoc on the 
state and local levels, since it is ultimately the local community 
that must absorb the growing population of undocumented 
immigrants.  The main complaints voiced by these 
communities are that these undocumented immigrants are 
responsible for a significant amount of job displacement among 
documented immigrants and native-born Americans, adversely 
affect their general way of life, and drain valuable resources 
from the communities forced to deal with this sizable 
population.19 
  
 14 Id. at 324 n.1.  See also Paul Magnusson, Go Back Where You Came From: 
Across the Country, a Grassroots Backlash Against Illegals is Building, BUS. WK., July 
4, 2005, at 86 (according to a new study by the Pew Hispanic Center, 1.4 million 
Mexicans have crossed over into the U.S. with 85% of them entering illegally since 
2000). 
 15 Hearing on Comprehensive Immigration Reform II Before the S. Comm. On 
the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Mark Krikorian, Ctr. for Immigr. 
Stud.) [hereinafter Immigration Reform II]. 
 16 George Bruno, a private attorney in Manchester, and former U.S. 
ambassador to Belize. 
 17 Stephen Seitz, Judge: Fining Illegals for Trespass Intrudes on Federal 
Authority, UNION LEADER, Aug. 13, 2005 (quoting George Bruno).  
 18 Immigration Reform II, supra note 15. 
 19 Ryan D. Frei, Comment, Reforming U.S. Immigration Policy in an Era of 
Latin American Immigration: The Logic Inherent in Accommodating the Inevitable, 39 
U. RICH. L. REV. 1355, 1380 (2005). 
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In past years of rising unemployment, state and local 
communities have contended that immigrants, in particular 
undocumented immigrants, are responsible for taking jobs 
away from American citizens.20 Empirical studies conducted in 
the early 1990s estimated that the total cost of job 
displacement due to undocumented immigrants would reach 
approximately $171.5 billion between 1993 and 2002.21  A 
recent study has also shown that new undocumented 
immigrants have substantially increased their ability to find 
work while the documented immigrants and native-born 
American citizens have seen a decrease in their ability to find 
employment between 2000 and mid-2003.22  Even the Supreme 
Court has supported the view that undocumented immigrants 
deprive citizens and legally admitted aliens of jobs and that 
their continued employment poses a threat to the wages and 
working conditions of citizens and legally admitted aliens.23 
The impact of lost jobs is especially concentrated in the 
area of low-skilled American workers where an estimated forty 
to fifty percent of wage loss is due to undocumented 
immigrants.24  It is estimated that there are more than 100,000 
day laborers25 distributed over at least four hundred different 
hiring sites within the United States.26  These workers for hire 
supply the increasing demand for cheap labor found in various 
communities.27 
Aside from taking jobs away, many communities 
contend that these groups create “unsanitary conditions” and 
are simply “aesthetically detrimental” to their neighborhood, 
  
 20 Id. 
 21 Turoff, supra note 9, at 184 n.40. 
 22 Frei, supra note 19, at 1379. 
 23 DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356-57 (1976): Employment of illegal aliens 
in times of high unemployment deprives citizens and legally admitted aliens of jobs; 
acceptance by illegal aliens of jobs on substandard terms as to wages and working 
conditions can seriously depress wage scales and working conditions of citizens and 
legally admitted aliens; and employment of illegal aliens under such conditions can 
diminish the effectiveness of labor unions.  Id. 
 24 Frei, supra note 19, at 1379. 
 25 Day laborers can be defined as individuals who gather at a particular 
hiring site to sell their labor for an hour, the day, or a particular job.  Due to their 
undocumented status or their inability to speak English, these laborers turn to this 
trade out of necessity.  Mauricio A. Espana, Day Laborers, Friend or Foe: A Survey of 
Community Responses, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1979, 1980-81 (2003).   
 26 Steven Greenhouse, Front Line in Day Laborer Battle Runs Right Outside 
Home Depot, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2005, at A1. 
 27 Espana, supra note 25, at 1980.   
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thus lowering the quality of life for many local residents.28  The 
complaints that the day laborers are unsanitary and 
aesthetically detrimental demonstrate the general disfavor 
that some local communities find with the presence of 
undocumented immigrants.29  The citizens of towns bordering 
Mexico cite this as a major issue within their communities.30  In 
one border town residents complained that the constant flow of 
approximately three hundred undocumented immigrants that 
travel through their town each night is overwhelming.31  The 
residents associate this growing population with an increase in 
crime, nuisance, and reckless behavior.32  Regardless of the 
validity of these concerns,33 the undocumented immigrants, 
whether working as day laborers or in transit from a border 
country, are highly visible, and local residents point the finger 
at them for unfairly forcing them to shoulder increased 
economic and social burdens.34 
The burdens that the local communities complain about 
are supported by empirical evidence from recent studies.35  One 
study estimated that $5.4 billion was spent in public assistance 
to undocumented immigrants in 1990.36  That same study 
stated that $11.9 billion was spent in public assistance and 
displacement costs for an undocumented population of 4.8 
million in 1992.37  More recent studies support these findings 
with an estimated $24 billion spent on social services for 
undocumented immigration.38  With an undocumented 
immigration population that is already estimated to be nearly 
double the amount cited in 1992,39 it is not surprising that the 
state and local communities are beginning to look to their local 
  
 28 Id.; See also Jon Ward, Arrests Not Linked to Illegals Crackdown, WASH. 
TIMES, Oct. 29, 2004, at B1 (local police receive “complaints about disorderly conduct by 
some of the day laborers such as public drunkenness, urinating in public and 
harassment of women who were entering a nearby rape crisis counseling center.”). 
 29 Frei, supra note 19, at 1380. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. 
 33 There are arguments that these assertions are facially invalid and that 
undocumented immigrants actually provide positive contributions to the U.S. economy 
and help create jobs in urban areas.  Turoff, supra note 9, at 184 n.41. 
 34 Frei, supra note 19, at 1380. 
 35 Turoff, supra note 9, at 183-84. 
 36 Id. at 183. 
 37 Id. at 183-84.  
 38 Id. at 184. 
 39 Current estimates state that there are eight to ten million undocumented 
immigrants within the U.S.  Sessions & Hayden, supra note 8, at 327. 
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law enforcement agencies to address these issues that they 
deal with on a daily basis. 
B. Exclusive Federal Authority over Immigration Law 
Historically, the federal government has had exclusive 
authority over immigration issues since the late nineteenth 
century.40  In 1849, the Supreme Court stated that the “whole 
subject of the admission of foreigners into the United States, 
and the terms upon which they shall be admitted, belongs, and 
must belong, exclusively to the national government.”41  The 
text in both the Constitution and the subsequent legislation by 
Congress, as well as general foreign policy concerns, empower 
the federal government with this exclusive authority.  
The enumerated and implied Constitutional powers are 
viewed as the source of Congress’ exclusive authority over 
immigration issues.42  The enumerated powers are derived from 
the commerce,43 naturalization,44 migration and importation,45 
and war power clauses.46  The implied Constitutional powers 
stem from the notion that this authority is simply an incident 
of sovereignty.47  This concept has its foundation in the 
“accepted maxim of international law, that every sovereign 
nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential 
to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within 
  
 40 Although there was no established federal immigration law until 1875, 
there was limited state legislation in the area to varying degrees.  Frei, supra note 19, 
at 1361, 1363. 
 41 Smith v. Turner (Passenger Cases), 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 305 (1849). 
 42 Kurzban, supra note 10, at 25. 
 43 Congress is authorized to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and 
among the several States.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 44 Congress is granted the power to “establish a uniform Rule of 
Naturalization.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 45 “The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now 
existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to 
the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on 
such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 
1. 
 46 Congress has the authority to “declare War, grant Letters of Marque and 
Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water.”  U.S. CONST. art. 
I, § 8, cl. 11.  This war power “permits the federal government to stop the entry of every 
alien and to expel them from the U.S.”  Kurzban, supra note 10, at 25. 
 47 Kurzban, supra note 10, at 25; Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The 
Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889) (J. Field declared that the power to 
exclude foreigners is “an incident of sovereignty.”). 
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its dominions, or to admit them only in such cases and upon 
such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe.”48   
Congress’s pervasive legislative activity further 
establishes that the federal government’s “plenary authority 
over immigration extends to the control of aliens within the 
borders of the U.S.”49  Congress demonstrated this authority 
when it first enacted the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(“INA”) in 1952, which remains the basic statute of current 
immigration law to this day.50  Within the general framework 
regarding admittance and deportation, there are many 
provisions of the INA that regulate the activities of foreign 
nationals within the United States.51  Since its enactment, 
there have been several significant amendments to the INA 
which have reached even further into the regulation of foreign 
national activity.52  One recent example is the USA PATRIOT 
Act which was enacted into law in response to the terrorist 
attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001.53 
With regard to the administration of the federal law, 
Congress has delegated most of its immigration authority to 
the executive branch.54  Now, instead of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (“INS”), the Department of Homeland 
Security (“DHS”), part of the executive branch, has nearly all of 
the authority to administer and enforce the federal 
immigration laws.55  The DHS is subdivided into three bureaus: 
the U.S. Citizen and Immigration Services (“UCIS”),56 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), and Customs 
  
 48 Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892). 
 49 Austin T. Fragomen, Jr. & Steven C. Bell, IMMIGRATION PRIMER 4 (1985). 
 50 Stephen Yale-Loehr, Overview of U.S. Immigration Law, 1477 PLI/CORP 
49, 56 (2005). 
 51 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1426 (2000) (aliens who seek exemption or discharge 
from the U.S. armed forces on account of their alien status are permanently barred 
from seeking citizenship); 8 U.S.C. § 1428 (2000) (temporary absences for “ministerial 
or priestly functions of a religious denomination” are excused and considered being 
“physically present and residing in the United States for the purpose of 
naturalization”); 8 U.S.C. § 1430(c) (2000) (special naturalization procedures for those 
who can prove that they work for certain nonprofit organizations within the U.S.). 
 52 Yale-Loehr, supra note 50, at 56. 
 53 Id. at 57. 
 54 Fragomen & Bell, supra note 49, at 4. 
 55 Yale-Loehr, supra note 50, at 59. 
 56 The UCIS Bureau performs the functions of adjudication of petitions and 
applications for immigration benefits.  ROBERT C. DIVINE, IMMIGRATION PRACTICE 2-2 
(2006-2007 ed. 2006). 
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and Border Protection (“CBP”) bureaus.57  The regulations 
promulgated by these various agencies provide the basic 
structure for enforcing the INA.58 
Separate and apart from the Constitution and the 
federal statutes lie foreign policy concerns related to the direct 
impact that immigration matters have on relations with other 
countries.59 These concerns grant inherent authority over this 
area to the national government.60  Therefore, the federal 
government must act in uniformity, as it does in all other areas 
of foreign policy, in order to advance two important aspects of 
immigration regulation.61  First, the manner in which the 
United States decides to treat foreign nationals, including 
deciding which ones to admit or expel, impacts U.S. relations 
with the home country of those nationals.62  Second, the federal 
government proactively utilizes immigration policy to advance 
significant foreign policy objectives that reach far beyond the 
admittance of individuals into the United States.63  These two 
critical aspects are the main reasons why the Supreme Court 
has ruled in favor of federal exclusivity over immigration 
matters.  For example, when the Court struck down a 
California statute that regulated the arrival of foreign 
passengers in Chy Lung v. Freeman, it noted that the federal 
government alone would be called to respond to any foreign 
policy consequences of state created immigration policy; 
therefore, the federal government alone should be the one to 
create such policy.64   
  
 57 Id. The CBP and ICE Bureaus handle the functions of border patrol, 
detention and removal, intelligence, investigations and inspections.  Id. 
 58 Yale-Loehr, supra note 50, at 59. 
 59 Huyen Pham, The Inherent Flaws In The Inherent Authority Position: Why 
Inviting Local Enforcement Of Immigration Laws Violates The Constitution, 31 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 965, 991 (2004). 
 60 Kurzban, supra note 10, at 25. 
 61 Pham, supra note 59, at 994. 
 62 Id. at 992-93. 
 63 Id. at 993-94. 
 64 Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 279-80 (1875). 
If [the federal] government has forbidden the States to hold negotiations with 
any foreign nations, or to declare war, and has taken the whole subject of 
these relations upon herself, has the Constitution, which provides for this, 
done so foolish a thing as to leave it in the power of the States to pass laws 
whose enforcement renders the general government liable to just 
reclamations which it must answer, while it does not prohibit to the States 
the acts for which it is held responsible?  
The Constitution of the United States is no such instrument. The passage of 
laws which concern the admission of citizens and subjects of foreign nations 
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The effect of post September 11th immigration 
legislation on relations between the United States and Mexico 
provides a specific example of how immigration policy decisions 
directly affect foreign policy.65  The United States severely 
restricted the immigration admittance standards in the 
interests of national security after the attacks by terrorists on 
September 11, 2001.66  Prior to these attacks, the United States 
and Mexico were involved in negotiations that would have 
established a historic bilateral migration agreement between 
the two countries.67   However, the September 11th terrorist 
attacks halted these discussions.68  This was seen as a principal 
driving force behind the Mexican President’s decision to break 
from the United States and vote against military action in 
Iraq.69  Foreign relations between the two countries have been 
described as “colder” ever since.70   
The changes that the federal government has made to 
the definitions regarding the admittance of refugees 
demonstrate the second foreign policy concern surrounding 
immigration.71  The President, in consultation with Congress, 
has the authority to determine the number of refugees to be 
admitted based on “humanitarian concern” or for other reasons 
of national interest.72  The United States has historically used 
this power to modify the refugee guidelines to admit nationals 
from countries that the United States considered adversaries.73  
By labeling these foreign nationals “legitimate refugees,” the 
United States uniformly denounced the policies advanced by 
their home countries.74  The federal government would lose the 
ability to send any strong unified statement without the 
exclusive authority to create these definitions. 
  
to our shores belongs to Congress, and not to the States. It has the power to 
regulate commerce with foreign nations: the responsibility for the character 
of those regulations, and for the manner of their execution, belongs solely to 
the national government. If it be otherwise, a single State can, at her 
pleasure, embroil us in disastrous quarrels with other nations. 
Id. at 280. 
 65 Pham, supra note 59, at 992. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. at 993. 
 70 Id.  
 71 Pham, supra note 59, at 993. 
 72 Id. at 992 n.139. 
 73 Id. at 993. 
 74 Id. 
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C. State and Local Authority to Enforce Immigration Law 
Despite what appears to be overwhelming authority for 
exclusive jurisdiction over immigration matters by the federal 
government, some argue that state and local law enforcement 
agencies can enforce immigration laws and have had inherent 
authority to do so ever since Congress enacted the Immigration 
and Nationality Act in 1952.75  Three sources that support this 
viewpoint are: (1) specific text within the INA; (2) federal 
judicial decisions;76 and (3) Congressional amendments that 
followed the enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act and the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
(AEDPA) that added further explicit authority to the powers of 
the state and local law enforcement agencies.77 
1. Statutory Support for Local Enforcement of 
Immigration Laws 
There is text within the INA that specifically supports 
local enforcement of immigration law.  Title 8 Section 1324(c) 
states that: 
No officer or person shall have authority to make any arrests for a 
violation of any provision of this section except officers and 
employees of the Service designated by the Attorney General, either 
individually or as a member of a class, and all other officers whose 
duty it is to enforce criminal laws.78   
Some argue that state and local law enforcement personnel fall 
under the “all other officers whose duty it is to enforce criminal 
laws” provision.79 This interpretation is most strongly 
supported by the INA’s legislative amendment history.80   
When Section 1324 was first enacted in 1954, the text 
read: “and all other officers of the United States whose duty it 
is to enforce criminal laws.”81  However, subsequent 
amendments ultimately removed the phrase “of the United 
States” from the statute.82  This reflects the Congressional 
  
 75 Michael M. Hethmon, The Chimera and the Cop: Local Enforcement of 
Federal Immigration Law, 8 D.C. L. REV. 83, 86-87 (2005). 
 76 Id. at 85-87. 
 77 Id. at 83-84; Sessions & Hayden, supra note 8, at 344. 
 78 8 U.S.C. § 1324(c) (2000) (emphasis added). 
 79 Sessions & Hayden, supra note 8, at 341-42. 
 80 Hethmon, supra note 75, at 86. 
 81 Id. (emphasis added). 
 82 Id.  
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intent not to limit the arrest authority to members of the 
federal government agencies, but rather to include state and 
local law enforcement departments as well.83 
In order to clarify any confusion surrounding the state 
and local enforcement authority, Congress passed the Doolittle 
Amendment to the AEDPA of 1996.84  The amended Act now 
states: 
(a) In general 
Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, to the extent permitted 
by relevant State and local law, State and local law enforcement 
officials are authorized to arrest and detain an individual who: 
(1) is an alien illegally present in the United States; and  
(2) has previously been convicted of a felony in the United 
States and deported or left in the United States after such 
conviction, but only after the State or local law enforcement 
officials obtain appropriate confirmation from the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service of the status of 
such individual and only for such a period of time as may be 
required for the Service to take the individual into Federal 
custody for purposes of deporting or removing the alien from 
the United States. 
(b) Cooperation 
The Attorney General shall cooperate with the States to assure that 
information in the control of the Attorney General, including 
information in the National Crime Information Center, that would 
assist State and local law enforcement officials in carrying out duties 
under subsection (a) of this section is made available to such 
officials.85 
After the terrorists attacked the United States on 
September 11, 2001, Congress enacted the USA PATRIOT Act, 
the Homeland Security Act, and the Enhanced Border Security 
and Visa Entry Reform Act.86  All of these amendments had a 
common stated goal:  “to improve federal and local cooperative 
efforts to detect and detain aliens participating in terrorist 
activities in the United States.”87  Section 287(g) of the INA 
addresses this particular legal concern by specifically 
authorizing the Attorney General to contract with state and 
  
 83 Id. at 86-87. 
 84 Sessions & Hayden, supra note 8, at 344. 
 85 8 U.S.C. § 1252c (2000). 
 86 Hethmon, supra note 75, at 83-84. 
 87 Id. at 84. 
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local agencies and have them perform certain functions of a 
federal immigration officer.88  The specific provision states that:  
[T]he Attorney General may enter into a written agreement with a 
State, or any political subdivision of a State, pursuant to which an 
officer or employee of the State or subdivision, who is determined by 
the Attorney General to be qualified to perform a function of an 
immigration officer in relation to the investigation, apprehension, or 
detention of aliens in the United States (including the transportation 
of such aliens across State lines to detention centers), may carry out 
such function at the expense of the State or political subdivision and 
to the extent consistent with State and local law.89 
State or local law enforcement officials that operate under one 
of these agreements receive extensive immigration law 
training.90  They are also given much broader authority to 
enforce the immigration laws as compared to their non-
deputized counterparts who only retain general inherent 
authority.91 
2. Judicial Support for Local Enforcement of 
Immigration Law 
Some courts have upheld the general proposition that 
state officials are not preempted from enforcing the federal 
immigration laws.  In People v. Barajas, the California 
Supreme Court did not find any express limitation on the local 
enforcement of specific areas of federal immigration law.92  The 
defendant in Barajas was originally arrested by local police for 
a traffic violation and for possession of a knife.93  The arresting 
police officer proceeded to question the defendant about his 
immigration status after reading him his Miranda rights.94  
The defendant replied that he had left his “green card” at 
home.95  The police issued a misdemeanor citation and released 
the defendant.96  The local police still suspected that the 
defendant was an undocumented immigrant and therefore 
  
 88 Sessions & Hayden, supra note 8, at 342. 
 89 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1) (2000). 
 90 Sessions & Hayden, supra note 8, at 345. 
 91 Id. 
 92 People v. Barajas, 147 Cal. Rptr. 195, 199 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978). 
 93 Id. at 197. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. 
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inquired with federal officials about the defendant’s status.97  
The INS agent informed the police that the defendant was 
apprehended on two prior occasions and was “formally 
deported” the second time.98  The INS agent then instructed the 
local police to arrest the defendant for violating Section 1326 of 
Title 8 by reentering the country after deportation without 
express permission from the Attorney General.99  The local 
police officers arrested the defendant as instructed.100 
The defendant in Barajas claimed that the local police 
officers did not have the authority to arrest him for violations 
of federal immigration law.101   The court rejected this 
argument and stated that the specific text found in Sections 
1325 and 1326 of Title 8 at the time did not contain the 
limiting language that Section 1324 had.102  The court stated 
that all three sections were originally drafted together, yet only 
Section 1324 was subsequently amended to include only 
“officers of the United States.”103  The court drew from this a 
clear Congressional intent that “arrests for violation of Section 
1324 were to be made only by federal personnel, while by clear 
implication, Sections 1325 and 1326 arrests were to be made by 
state and local officers as well.”104  The court went on to cite the 
supremacy clause as a “two-edged sword, and in the absence of 
a limitation, the states are bound by it to enforce violations of 
  
 97 Id. 
 98 Barajas, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 197. 
 99 Id. 
Any alien who— 
(1) has been denied admission, excluded, deported, or removed or has 
departed the United States while an order of exclusion, deportation, or 
removal is outstanding, and thereafter 
(2) enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in, the United States, 
unless (A) prior to his reembarkation at a place outside the United States or 
his application for admission from foreign contiguous territory, the Attorney 
General has expressly consented to such alien’s reapplying for admission; or 
(B) with respect to an alien previously denied admission and removed, unless 
such alien shall establish that he was not required to obtain such advance 
consent under this chapter or any prior Act, shall be fined under Title 18, or 
imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both. 
8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (2000). 
 100 Barajas, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 197. 
 101 Id. at 198. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. 
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the federal immigration laws.”105  This proposition strongly 
supports state and local enforcement authority by not only 
deeming it to be constitutionally acceptable, but a required 
obligation. 
All of the federal circuit courts that have ruled on this 
issue have held similarly when it comes to criminal violations 
of federal immigration laws.  In Gonzalez v. City of Peoria, the 
Ninth Circuit placed an interesting gloss over the Barajas 
decision.106 The defendants in Gonzalez, like the ones in 
Barajas, were stopped by local police, questioned, arrested, and 
detained in order to be released to federal immigration 
authorities.107  The defendants made similar claims that these 
arrests were unlawful under federal immigration law.108  The 
Gonzalez court ruled against them, however, stating that the 
text of Title 8 Section 1325 did not preclude local police from 
enforcing the statute.109  The distinguishing aspect of the 
Gonzalez decision lies in the particular attention to the fact 
that the Barajas opinion was based on a criminal offense.110  
The court stated that local authorities must distinguish 
between the criminal violation of illegal entry and the civil 
violation of illegal presence when enforcing violations of the 
federal immigration statute.111  The opinion went on to state 
that the civil provisions of the code constituted a “pervasive 
regulatory scheme, as would be consistent with the exclusive 
federal power over immigration.”112 
In Lynch v. Cannatella, the Fifth Circuit also addressed 
the issue of state and local enforcement of federal immigration 
laws.113  The court struck down the defendants’ arguments for 
  
 105 Id. at 199. 
 106 Gonzalez v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 475 (9th Cir. 1983), overruled on 
other grounds by Hodgers-Durgin v. De La Vina, 199 F.3d 1037, 1041 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 107 Id. at 472. 
 108 Id. at 474. 
 109 Id. at 475-77. 
 110 Id. at 476. 
 111 Id. at 477. 
 112 Gonzalez, 722 F.2d at 477.  It has been argued that this is merely dicta and 
outside the scope of the decision since the civil provisions of the INA were not an issue 
in this case.  Sessions & Hayden, supra note 8, at 333.  However, in support of the 
Ninth Circuit position, some states have specifically authorized the arrests for criminal 
violations of the INA but do not permit arrests based solely on undocumented 
immigrant status since these individuals may only be in violation of the civil provisions 
of the INA.  OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL STATE OF NEW YORK, INFORMAL 
OPINION NO. 2000-1, (2000) available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/lawyers/opinions/ 
2000/informal/2000_1.html. 
 113 Lynch v. Cannatella, 810 F.2d 1363, 1366 (5th Cir. 1987). 
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preemption and broadly held that there was no federal 
immigration law that precluded the enforcement of 
immigration law by state and local law enforcement 
personnel.114  With this broad statement the Lynch court 
seemed to indirectly disagree with the civil and criminal 
distinction drawn by the Ninth Circuit in Gonzalez.115 
In United States v. Vasquez-Alvarez, the Tenth Circuit 
rendered a decision that seemed to be more consistent with the 
broad holding in Lynch than the more restrictive decision set 
forth in Gonzalez.116  The Oklahoma police arrested the 
defendant in Vazquez-Alvarez based on his suspected 
undocumented status.117  Federal immigration authorities 
revealed that he had been previously arrested on felony 
charges and subsequently deported just as the defendant in 
Bajaras.118  The Vazquez-Alvarez Court reviewed the post 
AEDPA version of Title 8 U.S.C. Section 1252(c) and ruled that 
one of the main purposes in amending the statute was to settle 
any confusion regarding the authority of state and local 
authorities to enforce the federal immigration law.119  The 
Tenth Circuit used this reasoning to uphold the general 
concept that federal immigration law did not preempt the 
  
 114 Id. at 1371.  The court referenced the 1970 version of 8 U.S.C. § 1223(a) 
which outlined the duties of agents whose vessels bring aliens into U.S. ports and the 
duties of the immigration officials with regard to the removal of those aliens from the 
vessel.  Despite including the text “immigration officer” within the text of § 1223(a) the 
court stated that “[n]o statute precludes other federal, state, or local law enforcement 
agencies from taking other action to enforce this nation’s immigration laws.”  Id. 
Entry through or from foreign territory and adjacent islands 
Upon the arrival at a port of the United States of any vessel . . . bringing 
aliens . . . the immigration officers may order a temporary removal of such 
aliens for examination and inspection . . . but such temporary removal shall 
not be considered a landing, nor shall it relieve vessels . . . from any 
obligations which, in case such aliens remain on board, would, under the 
provisions of this chapter, bind such vessels . . . .  A temporary removal of 
aliens from such vessels . . . ordered pursuant to this subsection shall be 
made by an immigration officer at the expense of the vessel . . . and such 
vessel . . . shall, so long as such removal lasts, be relieved of responsibility for 
the safekeeping of such aliens:  Provided, that such vessels . . . may with the 
approval of the Attorney General assume responsibility for the safekeeping of 
such aliens during their removal . . . for examination and inspection, in which 
event, such removal need not be made by an immigration officer. 
8 U.S.C. § 1223(a) (1970). 
 115 See Lynch, 810 F.2d at 1371. 
 116 United States v. Vasquez-Alvarez, 176 F.3d 1294, 1295-96 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. at 1300. 
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ability of state and local law enforcement personnel to enforce 
the federal statutes.120 
The essential holding of the Bajaras opinion has been 
supported by the subsequent federal court decisions in the 
Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits.  The general rule that federal 
immigration law does not preempt state and local law 
enforcement remains intact even if the parallel courts did not 
address the specific warning regarding civil penalties pointed 
out by the Gonzalez court.  This authority at least signifies that 
criminal law enforcement of federal immigration law is not out 
of the reach of state and local authorities. 
III. THE STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE 
TO UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS 
The state and local law enforcement agencies dealing 
with the rising population of undocumented immigrants within 
their communities have taken various steps to address the 
issue.  The response taken by the New Hampshire authorities 
represents a novel technique, but not the only one.  There are 
three main categories of responses that state and local 
authorities have used recently.  First, existing state criminal 
statutes have been expanded to cover undocumented 
immigrants.121  The second category is similar in that it 
involves existing state laws, but distinct in that it deals with 
the arguably discriminatory enforcement of laws such as 
loitering and criminal nuisance.122  Third, state and local law 
enforcement agencies have received specific authority from the 
Department of Homeland Security to act as deputies of the 
federal immigration law pursuant to Section 287(g) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act as amended by the Homeland 
Security Act of 2002.123 
A. Expansion of Existing State Laws to Address 
Undocumented Immigration 
Local authorities have expanded existing state criminal 
statutes to cover undocumented immigrants.  In the recent 
  
 120 Id. 
 121 Local New Hampshire law enforcement’s use of the criminal trespass 
statute to detain suspected undocumented immigrants is an example of this first 
method.  See infra Part I. 
 122 See infra Part III.B. 
 123 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2000). 
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New Hampshire case, police arrested the eight suspected 
undocumented immigrants on separate occasions for criminal 
trespass after they produced fake identifications during traffic 
stops.124  The current New Hampshire criminal trespass statute 
states that “[a] person is guilty of criminal trespass if, knowing 
that he is not licensed or privileged to do so, he enters or 
remains in any place.”125  The local police from New Ipswich 
and Hudson, New Hampshire read this statute as authorizing 
them to arrest the suspected undocumented immigrants within 
the state’s borders because, as undocumented immigrants, they 
do not have any legal permission to be anywhere in the United 
States.126 
Richard E. Gendron, the police chief in one of the New 
Hampshire towns said, “the problem of illegal immigration is a 
real one faced by local police officers across the country.”127  He 
further stated that he “resorted to local charges after federal 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement officers declined to 
pick up the defendants when [the] officers stopped them earlier 
this year and the defendants could not produce valid 
immigration documents.”128  Officer Gendron was then quoted 
as saying that he still believed that he was “acting within the 
mission to enforce the laws of the state of New Hampshire, and 
acting in the best interests of the citizens of Hudson and in the 
interest of homeland security.”129  This novel interpretation of 
the reach of the statute was not explicitly struck down by the 
state judge citing a lack of precedent or legislative history on 
the subject.130  Instead, the judge relied on federal preemption 
standards stating that the charges were unconstitutional 
attempts to regulate in the area of enforcing immigration 
violations.131  Despite the court’s ruling, some still support the 
police chief’s broad interpretation of the criminal trespass 
statute.  State Representative David Buhlman has stated that 
he would seek legislation that would “beef up” the statute to 
  
 124 Judge Dismisses Trespassing Charges Against Illegal Immigrants, 
FOSTERS, Aug. 12, 2005. 
 125 N. H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 635:2 (2005). 
 126 Wolfe, supra note 4.  
 127 Vaishnav, supra note 2, at B3. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Wolfe, supra note 4. 
 131 New Hampshire v. Barros-Batistele, No. 05-CR-1474, 1475 (Nashua D. Ct. 
2005), available at http://www.courts.state.nh.us/district/criminal_trespass_ 
decision.pdf. 
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legitimize its use against undocumented immigrants despite 
the ruling on federal preemption.132 
New Hampshire is not the only state that has 
considered using this type of response.  State Representative 
Courtney Combs of Ohio has announced that he is drafting a 
new offense called “state trespass” that would make it a state 
criminal offense for an undocumented immigrant to cross 
Ohio’s borders.133  The proposal is only a portion of a multi-
tiered program that Combs is hoping to implement with the 
help of the Butler County Commissioner and a local Sheriff in 
an effort to round up all of the undocumented immigrants in 
the state and deport them.134  The proposed plan also involves 
adding a charge of falsification against inmates who lie about 
their citizenship when they are booked for another crime.135  
Once arrested, the state will make a demand to the federal 
immigration authorities to begin deportation proceedings or 
charge the federal government a fee of seventy dollars a day 
per prisoner.136  Butler County has already acted on the threat 
by billing the federal government $71,610 to house fifteen 
undocumented immigrant prisoners from June to October, 
2005.137  It is conceded, however, that this is merely a symbolic 
protest since the federal government does not have any 
obligation to pay the fines.138  The symbolism behind this 
movement and others like it represents the growing frustration 
with the inadequate federal government response to the issue 
of undocumented immigration.  Representative Combs denies 
that this is any sort of discrimination against a particular 
ethnic group, but instead believes that it is “about national 
security and the federal government’s failure to act.”139  
Whichever way people feel about Representative Combs’ action, 
what seems apparent is that this is just the beginning of states’ 
  
 132 Judge Dismisses Trespassing Charges Against Illegal Immigrants, supra 
note 124. 
 133 Mari Lolli, Cracking Down on Illegal Aliens, CINCINNATI POST, Oct. 22, 
2005, at A10. 
 134 Sheila McLaughlin, Butler Co. Talks Tough on Illegal Immigrants, 
CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Oct. 22, 2005, at 1. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id.  The charge of seventy dollars is said to offset the cost of keeping these 
individuals in state run holding facilities.  Id. 
 137 U.S. Billed For Immigrants, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Oct. 27, 2005, at 3. 
 138 Id. 
 139 Lolli, supra note 133, at A10. 
674 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:2 
actions to deal with the growing undocumented immigrant 
population. 
The local governments in New Hampshire and Ohio are 
not the only communities seeking new ways to address 
undocumented immigrants.  A recent case in Canyon County, 
Idaho further exemplifies the trend of local communities 
prepared to use creative interpretations of state and local laws 
in order to address immigration issues within their regions.140  
Canyon County filed suit in the District of Idaho against 
several local employers for violations of the Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”).141  A 
violation under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) requires that an enterprise 
be conducted through a pattern of racketeering activity.142  
Further, any RICO plaintiff must allege a direct causal link 
between the injury and the defendant’s violation in order to 
make a valid claim.143  Canyon County claimed that the 
defendants used their businesses as “association-in-fact 
enterprises for the purpose of obtaining and employing illegal 
immigrant workers to reduce labor costs.”144  Canyon County 
further asserted that it was harmed by being forced to provide 
medical and criminal justice services to these undocumented 
immigrants as a direct result of the defendants’ illegal 
racketeering activity.145   
The court first focused on Canyon County’s standing 
based on the alleged harm being inflicted by the defendants.146  
The defendants cited the “municipal cost recovery rule” in an 
effort to bar Canyon County’s claim.147 This rule holds that “the 
cost of public service for the protection from fire or safety 
hazards is to be borne by the public as a whole, not assessed 
  
 140 Canyon County v. Syngenta Seeds, Inc., No. CV05-306-S-EJL, 2005 WL 
3440474, at *1 (D. Idaho Dec. 14, 2005). 
 141 Id. 
 142 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988). 
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any 
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign 
commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of 
such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or 
collection of unlawful debt. 
Id. 
 143 Canyon County, 2005 WL 3440474, at *2. 
 144 Id. at *1. 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. at *2. 
 147 Id. 
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against the tortfeasor whose negligence creates the need for the 
service.”148  Canyon County alleged that the racketeering 
conducted by the defendants constituted criminal activity and 
therefore the “public nuisance” exception to the “municipal cost 
recovery rule” should apply.149  The court refused to apply this 
“public nuisance” exception for two reasons.150  First, the 
current Idaho Code does not “specifically identify criminal 
conduct as a public nuisance.”  Secondly, the court did not see 
this as a proper public nuisance claim.151  The court stressed 
the fact that Canyon County was not acting as a government 
entity “attempting to ‘abate’” a public nuisance in this action.152  
Instead, the court labeled the action a civil lawsuit in which 
Canyon County was appearing as a private party seeking to 
recover damages.153  Therefore, granting the relief sought in 
this action would “do nothing to stop or ‘abate’ the Defendants’ 
alleged criminal conduct.”154  The court went on to state that 
the action should be dismissed due to the plaintiff’s failure to 
overcome the “basic flaw” that the action was predicated on 
recovery for the “costs of municipal services.”155  This critical 
decision was celebrated by the local migrant worker council as 
a message that the immigration problems cannot be “solved in 
this manner.”156  However, the county commissioner, who is just 
as determined as Representative Renzullo in New Hampshire 
and Representative Combs in Ohio to address the 
undocumented immigrant situation without the assistance of 
federal authorities, is seeking to appeal this decision.157  It 
would not be surprising to see similar actions taken by more 
local communities throughout the country if the undocumented 
immigrant population continues to expand at its current rate. 
  
 148 Flagstaff v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co., 719 F.2d 322, 323 
(9th Cir. 1983) (citing City of Bridgeton v. B.P. Oil, Inc., 369 A.2d 49 (1976)). 
 149 Canyon County, 2005 WL 3440474, at *3. 
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. 
 154 Id. 
 155 Canyon County, 2005 WL 3440474, at *6. 
 156 Rebecca Boone, Judge Dismisses Idaho Lawsuit Against Employers of 
Allegedly Illegal Immigrants, COLUMBIAN (Vancouver, WA), Dec. 15, 2005, at C5. 
 157 Id. 
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B. Targeted Enforcement of Existing State Laws to Address 
Undocumented Immigration 
Other state and local enforcement agencies have taken a 
different approach to the undocumented immigration problem 
by enforcing existing laws in arguably discriminatory ways 
rather than expanding those laws’ interpretations or creating 
new legislation.  In Virginia, twenty-two day laborers were 
arrested near a 7-Eleven on a charge of loitering, after being 
warned for several weeks that they should not be gathering 
around the convenience store.158  The local police denied that 
this was an immigration concern, and instead labeled it “purely 
a community maintenance issue.”159  However, once the 
immigrants were arrested, those that could not produce 
identification were immediately taken into custody and officers 
performed background checks on them.  The investigations 
revealed that some of them were flagged with deportation 
notices from the Bureau of Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement.160  These men were reported and faced 
deportation.161  Given the loitering provision’s history of 
discriminatory enforcement in the past,162 the local immigrant 
population may have reason to become alarmed about the 
precedent that these arrests have created.163  The local police 
still maintain, however, that deportation of these individuals 
was not the ultimate goal of the arrests.  They claim that the 
arrests were in response to numerous complaints from local 
citizens regarding the disorderly conduct of some of the day 
laborers.164 
Similar community maintenance concerns were used as 
the justification for the raiding and closing of a home in 
  
 158 Ward, supra note 28, at B1. 
 159 Id. 
 160 Id. 
 161 Id. 
 162 In Chicago v. Morales, the Supreme Court struck down a city ordinance 
which prohibited “‘criminal street gang members’ from ‘loitering’ with one another or 
with other persons in any public place” due to a vagueness violation of the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.  The Court concluded 
that the ordinance afforded “too much discretion to the police and too little notice to 
citizens who wish to use the public streets.” It further stated that the ordinance’s 
“relative importance to its application to harmless loitering is magnified by its 
inapplicability to loitering that has an obviously threatening or illicit purpose.”  527 
U.S. 41, 45-46, 63-64 (1999). 
 163 Ward, supra note 28, at B1. 
 164 Id. 
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Farmingville, New York, which sheltered as many as sixty-four 
male occupants believed to be day laborers.165  This was the 
first house in the locality to be shut down for illegal 
overcrowding, and the raid resulted in an additional 117 people 
being targeted for investigation.166  The police arrested the 
owner of the home on criminal contempt and criminal nuisance 
charges due to her failure to adhere to State Supreme Court 
orders regarding compliance with building codes.167  Supporters 
of the immigrant workers point out that a discriminatory 
intent may have been present because non-immigrant homes in 
neighboring communities would violate the specific text of the 
illegal overcrowding ordinance yet were not targeted.168  County 
executive Steve Levy has argued that he is merely enforcing 
the law.169  However, he also admitted to first trying to deputize 
  
 165 Bruce Lambert, L.I. Home Held Up to 64 Men, Authorities Say, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 21, 2005, at B1. 
 166 Id. 
 167 Id.  See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 215.50 (McKinney 2000); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 
240.45 (McKinney 2000). 
Criminal contempt in the second degree 
A person is guilty of criminal contempt in the second degree when he engages 
in any of the following conduct: 
. . . 
3. Intentional disobedience or resistance to the lawful process or other 
mandate of a court except in cases involving or growing out of labor disputes 
as defined by subdivision two of section seven hundred fifty-three-a of the 
judiciary law; or 
. . . 
6. Intentional failure to obey any mandate, process or notice, issued pursuant 
to articles sixteen of the judiciary law, or to rules adopted pursuant to any 
such statute or to any special statute establishing commissioners of jurors 
and prescribing their duties or who refuses to be sworn as provided 
therein . . . . 
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 215.50. 
Criminal nuisance in the second degree 
A person is guilty of criminal nuisance in the second degree when: 
1. By conduct either unlawful in itself or unreasonable under all the 
circumstances, he knowingly or recklessly creates or maintains a condition 
which endangers the safety or health of a considerable number of persons; or 
2. He knowingly conducts or maintains any premises, place or resort where 
persons gather for purposes of engaging in unlawful conduct. 
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.45. 
 168 Lambert, supra note 165. 
 169 Paul Vitello, Responding to the Law of ‘Nimby,’ N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2005, 
at 14LI. 
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county police officers as federal immigration agents before 
being halted by the police union, thereby calling his stated 
innocuous motivation into question.170 
C. Recruitment of State and Local Enforcement Agencies by 
the Federal Government 
Although Mr. Levy did not have much success in his 
attempt to deputize his local police force, other states have 
effectively implemented such programs.  The judge that 
handed down the opinion in the New Hampshire case 
specifically stated that there were provisions in the federal law 
under which local authorities could be deputized to enforce 
federal immigration law.171 
On August 15, 2005, Arizona Governor Janet 
Napolitano declared a state of emergency along the state 
border in an effort to provide relief to areas affected by a rising 
undocumented immigrant population and an increasing 
amount of cross-border crime.172  This action freed up both state 
and federal emergency funds that are normally reserved for 
natural disasters.173  Prior to this declaration, Napolitano 
expressed disappointment and impatience with the federal 
government’s “red tape,” and its inability to provide any 
response to the immigration issues in her state.174  The 
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, Michael 
Chertoff, finally gave in to the requests for action and offered to 
coordinate efforts between the federal agencies and the local 
police forces in Arizona.175  The Arizona Department of 
Corrections and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) on 
September 16, 2005.176  This agreement set forth the terms by 
which the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Bureau 
authorizes qualified state law enforcement personnel to 
  
 170 Id. 
 171 Judge Dismisses Trespassing Charges Against Illegal Immigrants, supra 
note 124. 
 172 Michael Marizco, State Grants Pima $415K in Border-Emergency Funds, 
ARIZ. DAILY STAR, Sept. 29, 2005, at B4. 
 173 Id. 
 174 Steven Bodzin, Homeland Security Agrees to Coordinate With State Police, 
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2005, at A17. 
 175 Id. 
 176 Memorandum of Understanding (Sept. 16, 2005), available at 
http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/newsreleases/articles/050920phoenix.htm. 
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perform certain functions of an immigration officer.177  The 
authority to enter into this agreement comes from Section 
287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended by 
the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law 207-276.178 
The agreement contains specific terms and conditions 
under which the federal and state departments must operate,179 
including: the procedures for nominating and training 
personnel, supplying certification and authorization, and the 
supervision activities of the U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement agency.180  This last section is significant given the 
concerns surrounding such a delegation of power.  It 
specifically affirms that state corrections personnel “cannot 
perform any immigration officer functions pursuant to DHS 
authorities . . . except when working under the supervision of 
an ICE officer.”181  The agreement goes on to state that the 
actions of state personnel “will be reviewed by the ICE [agents] 
on an ongoing basis to ensure compliance with the 
requirements of the immigration laws and procedures and to 
assess the need for additional training or guidance for that 
specific individual.”182 
IV. THE IMPROPER USE OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW 
ENFORCEMENT TO ADDRESS UNDOCUMENTED 
IMMIGRANTS; DEPUTIZING IS THE BETTER ALTERNATIVE  
The expansion and discriminatory enforcement of 
existing state laws to address undocumented immigration 
suffer from two critical flaws.  First, these tactics 
impermissibly expand the powers that are recognized within 
the states’ authority under statutory law and case law and are 
in direct contradiction to established federal authority.  Second, 
the methods imposed by these state and local authorities are 
not effective in addressing the concerns of their local 
communities and are merely shortsighted solutions to 
particularly complex issues.  These state and local agencies 
should therefore rely on their ability to work in coordination 
with the federal authorities as deputies of federal immigration 
  
 177 Id. ¶ I. 
 178 See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1) (2000). 
 179 Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 176, ¶ I. 
 180 Id. ¶ IV-VII, IX. 
 181 Id. ¶ IX. 
 182 Id. 
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law as a more effective solution to their local concerns 
regarding undocumented immigrants. 
A. State and Local Actions Represent an Unlawful 
Expansion of Established Authority 
The state and local authorities are in direct conflict with 
established law when they choose to address the undocumented 
immigrant situation by either expanding or discriminatorily 
enforcing their existing state laws.  These methods go beyond 
the limited recognized authority that state and local agencies 
have in the enforcement of immigration laws.  More 
importantly, these tactics severely hamper the uniformity 
requirement that is inherent within all foreign policy areas in 
which the field of immigration law is undoubtedly a member. 
Unlike the federal government, the states do not have 
any expressed constitutional authority over foreign policy.183  
However, this does not mean that they are completely devoid of 
the ability to assist in the enforcement of federal immigration 
laws.  The courts have already determined that the 
Immigration and Naturalization Act “cannot be inferred [to 
mean] that the federal government has occupied the field of 
criminal immigration enforcement.”184  The Act even provides 
specific provisions that allow state and local police officers to 
act as immigration officers within certain limitations.185  
This established authority has its limits.  By accepting 
the concept that state and local law enforcement personnel 
have the inherent authority to make arrests under the federal 
immigration law, one must also accept the fact that this 
authority is limited to enforcement and does not include any 
permission to regulate.186  Proposing otherwise would contradict 
the Supreme Court’s idea that “the federal government, as 
represented by Congress, has nearly complete power to 
determine immigration policies, thereby restricting the states 
  
 183 Karl Manheim, State Immigration Laws and Federal Supremacy, 22 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 939, 940 (1995). 
 184 Gonzalez v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 475 (9th Cir. 1983), overruled on 
other grounds by Hodgers-Durgin v. De La Vina, 199 F.3d 1037, 1041 (9th Cir. 1999).  
See also supra notes 105-20 and accompanying text. 
 185 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(c), 1324(c), & 1357(g) (2000) (different provisions 
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from enacting immigration legislation of their own.”187  
However, the Court has never held that every state law that 
somehow deals with aliens is “a regulation of immigration and 
thus per se pre-empted.”188  Federal authority is preemptive of 
state regulatory power only when there are “persuasive 
reasons—either that the nature of the regulated subject matter 
permits no other conclusion, or that the Congress has 
unmistakably so ordained.”189 
When state and local authorities expand or interpret 
local laws as tools to deal with undocumented immigration, as 
they hope to do in New Hampshire and Virginia, they are 
impermissibly entering into the area of immigration regulation.  
Congress has unmistakably spoken regarding the limited role 
that state and local law enforcement agencies may play in the 
arrest of individuals for immigration violations.  Indeed, 
Congress has provided specific statutes in each instance where 
it deemed it appropriate.190  These statutes carry with them 
conditions and prerequisites by which state and local 
authorities must abide.191  When the states target 
undocumented immigrants by creating new expansive trespass 
laws or by discriminatorily enforcing a nuisance statute, they 
are granting themselves new powers that are entirely separate 
from those enumerated in the federal code.  This expanded 
authority goes “directly to the subject matter of sanctions and 
penalties for immigration violations set forth in the INA,” and 
are therefore preempted by federal authority.192 
Most importantly, if state and local authorities were 
permitted to unilaterally create new immigration regulation in 
this manner they would be working directly against any 
attempt to have a uniform federal immigration policy.  The 
  
 187 Yale-Loehr, supra note 50, at 55. 
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decision.pdf. 
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“very nature” of immigration regulation and its impact on 
foreign relations provide persuasive reasons why this should 
not be permitted.193  If Ohio and New Hampshire, or their 
respective municipalities, passed their own trespass laws 
covering undocumented immigrants there would be no 
obligation on either party to pass identical or even similar 
regulations.  Their definitions could be entirely independent of 
each other and therefore treat the same federally determined 
undocumented immigrant in drastically different ways. 
The discriminatory enforcement of state and local laws 
such as nuisance and loitering, which is the other technique 
used by state and local law enforcement, lacks uniformity even 
within the borders of the municipality that is practicing it.  
This impact would only be exacerbated when brought to a 
nationwide basis.  The end result would be a single country 
with a “thousand borders” which would be in direct conflict 
with the “constitutional mandate for uniform immigration 
laws.”194 
B. State and Local Actions are Ineffective 
The conflict with established law is not the only 
difficulty that the states will face in adopting these methods to 
address their local undocumented immigration issues.  These 
methods are ineffective since they do not address the primary 
issue and involve various difficulties in their implementation.  
These tactics not only fail to reach their supposed goals, but 
also promote a distrust of state and local authorities with the 
potential to further disrupt the lives of the local residents. 
The fact that the loitering arrests in Virginia revealed 
undocumented immigrants that are already facing deportation 
procedures195 does not justify the use of these statutes in this 
manner.  The clearest counter to this justification is the fact 
that the state and local law enforcement agencies already have 
the authority to arrest individuals that they have probable 
cause to believe are undocumented immigrants.196  The case law 
supports this approach and it is consistent with the rest of the 
existing immigration authority.197  The law does not support 
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 196 See supra Part II.C. 
 197 Id. 
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arresting individuals that fit a broad category of stereotypical 
norms.198  It should be pointed out that half of the supposed 
loiterers that were arrested in Virginia actually had valid 
documentation and were eventually released.199  This rate of 
success should not be deemed an acceptable justification for 
rounding up individuals based on certain patterns of activity or 
appearance that fit a “typical” undocumented immigrant. 
The closing of the crowded house in Long Island, New 
York addresses the situation with little more success than the 
arrests in Virginia.  The individuals that were living within the 
home were not evicted and there were no reports that they 
were either arrested or submitted to any form of immigration 
proceedings.200  The individuals were merely forced out onto the 
streets to look for accommodations elsewhere, thereby pushing 
them out into neighboring communities, without solving the 
true national concerns that these local authorities rely on as 
their principal reason for acting in the first place.  The court in 
Canyon County spotted this as a principal reason why the 
public nuisance claim should fail, since the civil claim was not 
directly targeted at abetting the practice of hiring 
undocumented immigrants.201 
The lack of federal cooperation at the outset of these 
independent actions only adds to the difficulty.  The 
individuals that are eventually taken into custody are not 
guaranteed to reach the national agencies that can administer 
available solutions through deportation hearings if necessary 
or through proper immigration filings to gain legitimate status 
to remain and work within the United States.202  Due to this 
fact, all individuals arrested by the state will be held in local 
jails, thus costing state and local communities more.  
Furthermore, the state system is not one that can address 
immigration issues.  The states cannot propose it would be in 
their interests to construct a local immigration processing 
facility to administer immigration proceedings the federal 
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government currently controls.  The costs and administration 
of such a system would pose tremendous burdens to law 
enforcement agencies that are already complaining about the 
costs of these quick fix approaches.203 
Proponents of these tactics still argue that the 
proliferation of undocumented immigration is a threat to 
national security and could expose the country to terrorism.204  
It is conceded that the Department of Homeland Security has 
taken a stricter stance on border control as a direct response to 
this very concern.205  However, it is a much more difficult 
proposition to argue that the arrests of a group of day laborers 
gathered around a 7-Eleven206 addresses this issue with any 
degree of effectiveness.  The loiterers arrested in Virginia were 
never initially accused or investigated for any supposed threat 
to national security.207  It is possible that the expansion of 
criminal laws such as the trespass laws could provide the 
sufficient breadth to address any individual suspected of 
terrorism ties.  Proponents of this idea are quick to point out 
that three of the suicide terrorists hijackers from the 
September 11th attacks were all stopped by local police forces 
for traffic violations, but were eventually released without any 
involvement of federal immigration authorities.208  This 
terrorist attack was unquestionably one of the worst 
experiences in our national history.  However, the malevolence 
that surrounded it should not further disrupt our way of life by 
permitting arbitrary arrests and unlawful interrogations. 
The proliferation of these discriminatory practices is one 
of the principle reasons why opponents of the state and local 
enforcement of immigration laws feel that there will be a 
detrimental impact on the lives of those affected by such an 
administration.209  The big difficulty that arises is the distrust 
amongst the general population of the state and local 
authorities called to implement this sort of administration.210  
  
 203 See Pham, supra note 59, at 984. 
 204 Sessions & Hayden, supra note 8, at 327-28. 
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The basic idea surrounding this theory is that the state and 
local authorities lack the training and expertise to make valid 
arrests or inquiries and may choose to use inappropriate 
signals such as apparent ethnicity or race to determine 
whether or not to inquire about a person’s immigration 
status.211  This distrust of local authorities could have severe 
impacts on the way people carry out their daily lives.212  Some 
municipalities such as New York City have addressed this 
concern by prohibiting certain city officers and public 
employees from inquiring about someone’s immigration 
status.213  This policy was part of an effort to ensure that all 
residents regardless of their immigration status receive critical 
services such as emergency healthcare and police protection.214   
C. Deputizing State and Local Authorities Represents a 
Better Solution 
This is not a proposal to eliminate local enforcement of 
immigration laws within the United States.215  It is merely a 
suggestion that there is a more effective and efficient way of 
approaching the situation that does not tread on preemptive 
authority while at the same time adding significant controls 
against discrimination and non-uniformity.  One such approach 
is the authority to deputize local law enforcement agencies to 
work for, and under the supervision of, national immigration 
authorities.216  Indeed this has been listed as the first step in 
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any practical implementation of an immigration law 
enforcement program in a local jurisdiction.217 
This method of law enforcement addresses almost all of 
the flaws inherent in the previously mentioned techniques.  
The state and local authorities will be trained to “avoid actions 
that could constitute unconstitutional discrimination against 
citizens and lawfully-present aliens on the basis of national 
origin or foreign appearance.”218  Moreover, these actions will be 
under the direct supervision and authority of the federal 
agencies that can actually take federally reserved actions such 
as deportation.219  Most importantly, all deputized state and 
local authorities would be enforcing the single federal 
immigration law.220  This is in sharp contrast to the non-
uniform tactics of creating new expansive trespass laws or 
discriminatorily enforcing public nuisance regulations.  The 
burden, however, lies on the state governments to request this 
assistance and on federal authorities to act once they are 
asked, instead of waiting for a governor to declare a state of 
emergency before agreeing to cooperate.221 
V. CONCLUSION 
State and local authorities should not feel powerless in 
their attempts to address the undocumented immigrant 
situations within their communities.  The current federal 
structure of immigration regulation leaves room for the 
involvement of state and local officials.  Those officials have 
specific authority to enforce the federal immigration law when 
it comes to criminal violations and can even enter into specific 
agreements with the federal government to receive the training 
and supervision necessary to allow their agencies to take on 
more expansive roles in the area of immigration enforcement.  
Conflicts only arise when the state and local authorities take it 
upon themselves to unilaterally create new immigration 
regulation whether by directly enacting new expansive laws or 
enforcing existing laws in a targeted manner against 
undocumented immigrants.  These tactics not only go against 
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established law, but present further difficulties for the local 
communities that are forced to deal with them.  It would be 
more appropriate for these state and local entities to adhere to 
their federally structured authority in order to protect against 
unlawful discrimination and preserve a single unified 
immigration policy across the entire nation.222 
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